Part X: Science & Society
Chapters 28–30: Values & Objectivity, Social Epistemology of Science, and Ethics of Scientific Research
Science does not take place in a vacuum. It is a social activity, carried out by human beings embedded in institutions, cultures, and political contexts. The traditional image of the scientist as a lone genius pursuing truth in splendid isolation has long been recognized as a myth. Yet the implications of science’s social character for its epistemic authority remain deeply contested. If scientific knowledge is socially produced, is it also socially constructed? If scientists bring values to their work, can science still be objective? If scientific research has ethical implications, who bears responsibility?
Part X of this course addresses the relationship between science and society from three complementary perspectives. First, we examine the question of values and objectivity: can science be free from non-epistemic values, and if not, what does this mean for scientific objectivity? Second, we explore social epistemology of science: how does the social organization of science — peer review, division of labor, consensus formation — affect the reliability of scientific knowledge? Third, we confront the ethics of scientific research: what moral responsibilities do scientists bear, and how should research be governed?
These questions have never been more urgent. In an era of climate change denial, pandemic misinformation, gene editing controversies, and artificial intelligence, the relationship between science and society is a matter of existential importance. The philosophy of science has much to contribute to these public debates — not by providing easy answers, but by clarifying the conceptual issues at stake and distinguishing good arguments from bad ones.
The Social Turn in Philosophy of Science
The traditional philosophy of science, from the logical positivists through Popper and the early Kuhn, focused on the logic of science: the structure of theories, the logic of confirmation, the nature of explanation. Questions about the social organization of science were dismissed as belonging to the sociology of science rather than its philosophy. The philosopher Hans Reichenbach drew a sharp distinction between the “context of discovery” (how scientists actually come up with ideas) and the “context of justification” (how ideas are rationally evaluated), arguing that only the latter was philosophically relevant.
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) began to erode this distinction. By emphasizing the role of paradigms, scientific communities, and the sociology of consensus formation, Kuhn opened the door to a more socially engaged philosophy of science. The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) that emerged in the 1970s — associated with David Bloor, Barry Barnes, and the Edinburgh “Strong Programme” — went further, arguing that social factors play a constitutive role in the production of scientific knowledge.
“The central claim of the Strong Programme is that the same types of cause would explain true and false beliefs alike. This is the symmetry requirement.”— David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976)
The ensuing “Science Wars” of the 1990s pitted defenders of scientific objectivity against social constructivists. The physicist Alan Sokal’s famous hoax — publishing a nonsensical article in a cultural studies journal — dramatized the tensions. But the most productive outcome of these debates was not the victory of one side but the emergence of a more sophisticated understanding of how social factors interact with epistemic ones in the production of scientific knowledge.
Today, the social dimensions of science are taken seriously by philosophers, sociologists, and scientists alike. The question is no longer whether science is social, but how its social character bears on its epistemic authority. The chapters in Part X explore this question from multiple angles.
Why Science & Society Matters Now
The topics in Part X are not merely theoretical. They bear directly on some of the most pressing issues of our time:
- •Climate science and policy: The relationship between scientific evidence and policy recommendations involves both epistemic values (accuracy, scope) and non-epistemic values (precaution, economic impact). Understanding how values enter science is essential for evaluating climate policy debates.
- •Trust in science: Public trust in scientific institutions has been strained by the replication crisis, pharmaceutical industry scandals, and politicized debates over pandemic measures. Social epistemology helps us understand how scientific credibility is established and maintained — and how it can be undermined.
- •Emerging technologies: Gene editing (CRISPR), artificial intelligence, and synthetic biology raise novel ethical questions that cannot be answered by science alone. Research ethics must evolve to meet these new challenges.
- •Diversity and inclusion: Feminist epistemology has shown how the demographic composition of scientific communities can affect what questions are asked, what hypotheses are considered, and what evidence is taken seriously. Standpoint theory and related approaches challenge the traditional view that the identity of the knower is irrelevant to knowledge.
The philosophy of science is uniquely positioned to address these issues because it takes seriously both the epistemic authority of science and the social conditions of its production. It avoids the extremes of naive scientism (science is infallible) and radical constructivism (science is just politics by other means), seeking instead a nuanced account of how fallible, value-laden, socially organized inquiry can nevertheless produce reliable knowledge about the world.
Chapters in Part X
Values & Objectivity
Can science be value-free? We examine the value-free ideal, the argument from inductive risk, Kuhn’s epistemic values, Longino’s interactive objectivity, feminist epistemology of science, and the role of values in policy-relevant research.
Social Epistemology of Science
How does the social organization of science affect the reliability of scientific knowledge? We examine the Strong Programme, Latour’s laboratory studies, the Science Wars, Kitcher’s division of cognitive labor, peer review, and the epistemology of scientific consensus.
Ethics of Scientific Research
What moral responsibilities do scientists bear? We examine research ethics (informed consent, the Nuremberg Code), responsible conduct of research, dual-use dilemmas, animal experimentation, gene editing ethics, AI and algorithmic bias, Merton’s norms, and scientific integrity.
Key Thinkers in Part X
| Thinker | Key Contribution | Chapter |
|---|---|---|
| Richard Rudner | The argument from inductive risk | 28 |
| Heather Douglas | Renewed argument from inductive risk; roles for values | 28 |
| Helen Longino | Contextual empiricism; interactive objectivity | 28 |
| Sandra Harding | Standpoint epistemology | 28 |
| David Bloor | The Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge | 29 |
| Bruno Latour | Laboratory studies; actor-network theory | 29 |
| Philip Kitcher | Division of cognitive labor; well-ordered science | 29 |
| Alvin Goldman | Veritistic social epistemology | 29 |
| Robert K. Merton | CUDOS norms of science | 30 |
Essential Readings
- •Douglas, H. (2009). Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal, Chapters 1–5.
- •Longino, H. (1990). Science as Social Knowledge, Chapters 3–5.
- •Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery, Chapters 1–2.
- •Latour, B. & Woolgar, S. (1979/1986). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts.
- •Kitcher, P. (2001). Science, Truth, and Democracy, Chapters 6–8.
- •Harding, S. (1991). Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?, Chapters 5–6.
- •Merton, R.K. (1942). “The Normative Structure of Science,” in The Sociology of Science.
- •Rudner, R. (1953). “The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments,” Philosophy of Science 20(1).
Guiding Questions for Part X
- Can science be value-free, or do non-epistemic values inevitably play a role in scientific reasoning?
- If values are inescapable in science, does this undermine scientific objectivity? Or can objectivity be reconceived?
- Should true and false scientific beliefs be explained by the same types of causes (the symmetry principle)?
- Is scientific knowledge “constructed” in any interesting sense, or is social constructivism a threat to rationality?
- How should the division of cognitive labor in science be organized to maximize the chances of finding truth?
- When should non-experts defer to scientific consensus? What are the conditions for rational deference?
- What ethical constraints should govern scientific research? Who should decide?
- Does Merton’s idealized picture of scientific norms describe actual scientific practice?